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17 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 17 October 1969

ADD/I briefed on the most recent SR-71 coverage over North Vietnam, adding that there is nothing out of the ordinary to report except that the coverage was extremely good.

DD/ONE noted General Bennett's request that a Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-11-69, Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities, be developed. After some discussion the Director concurred in DD/ONE's suggestion that this matter be discussed with the USIB Representatives.

DD/S briefed on the case in which a former Air America employee lodged some allegations with Senator Proxmire, who referred the matter to [] resulting in a GAO investigation. He noted that GAO's work has been completed and that they have provided a very good reply, the results of which are quite favorable.

DD/S noted that the price of haircuts is going to \$2.25. A brief discussion followed.

Carver noted that the Laos OB material was distributed yesterday and was greatly appreciated, especially in J-5 (see Morning Meeting Minutes of 9 and 13 October).

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Carver traced to Senator Mathias a recently received requirement from the NSC for a paper on "Hanoi's problems." Carver noted that they are preparing a three-page blind memorandum, and the Director thought this a good idea.

Maury briefed on a recent conversation with Frank Slatinshek concerning our draft retirement legislation. In response to the Director's question Maury noted that he has also discussed this matter with Ed Braswell.

Houston noted that he will be going to Baltimore today in connection with the [] case.

Parrott briefed on agenda items for the scheduled meetings of PFIAB on 23 and 24 October.

In response to Parrott's question the Director suggested that General Robert Taylor not pursue matters pertaining to our problems

DD/S&T briefed on progress made in verifying Soviet naval matters

DD/P read from a report on the views of a Soviet Southeast Asian expert on prospects for settlement in Southeast Asia.

DD/P provided the Director a memorandum reflecting talks with

Executive Director recalled the Director's remarks before the Under Secretaries Committee in which he mentioned that there are [] He mentioned that he recently received a call from [] relating that there are actually []

DDCI briefly reported on his visit yesterday to [] to the effect that morale and organization there are excellent.

The Director called attention to a critical article in the Government Executive sent him by Goodwin (attached). The Director noted it has

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been determined that the author was probably [redacted]

[redacted] Goodwin noted that according to the masthead Government Executive is owned by a subsidiary of Litton Industries. The Director noted that he has asked the IG to look into the allegation made in the article.

The Director briefed on the 15 October NSC meeting on U. S. policy in Latin America.

Goodwin noted receipt from [redacted] of ten letters received at the White House indicating concern over the CIA/Green Beret matter. The Director asked Goodwin to get together with Maury and develop a suggested response to such letters.

[redacted]
L. K. White

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CIA

Internal Friction

Things are not going well within the CIA, and it is not going unnoticed at the White House according to informed sources.

Friction is common at various working levels at the agency, and what has evolved since the Nixon Administration took over is a classic battle between the "generalists" and the "experts."

Throughout its history, CIA has tried to play honest broker, fending off the sometimes biased use of intelligence by the Pentagon and State Department. All in all, it has been pretty successful. Sometimes, however, and with alarming frequency lately, CIA has not done well, showing up on critical issues as merely an "also ran."

Experts Not Allowed to Speak

Government Executive's sources indicate that CIA's experts (and it has some of the best in Government) are not being allowed to speak. Many of the persons with in-depth knowledge and virtually unassailable judgment and proven records of performance are simply out of the mainstream.

This is due largely to the fact that many of their substantive views are not in accord with the more conventional views of the management. The sources reveal that on many of the crucial issues lately—the SS-9, the ABM and Vietnam—the experts have had the guts to disagree with the popular concepts.

The management, however, employs the age-old bureaucratic mechanism of the conference to muzzle the experts. By this process everyone remotely concerned with a problem has to agree to the final version of a study.

The theory is to bring in the best ideas from everyone. The fallacy in this, however, lies in the fact that not everyone is equally capable or perceptive.

Sources state that lately what may have started out to be a piece of penetrating insight into a crucial question more often than not turns out to be a wishy-washy, "maybe it will" and "maybe it won't" type of nonintelligence. Some of the recent studies reportedly have covered every possibility 10 men can think of without saying just what it is that could really happen.

One of the reasons behind this difference of views stems from professional approach. First-rate analysts have built up an understanding of a problem through years of close association with it. They understand the nuances and background to the problem and, in effect, are capable of thinking like the enemy thinks.

In many cases this type of thinking defies conventional American logic. Vietnam is a good example. American

logic demanded that the Tet Offensive of 1968 was a military failure; North Vietnamese logic, on the other hand, viewed it as a success, and our sources indicate that analysts at CIA said so.

First-rate intelligence requires first-rate people, people who are unafraid of questioning the conventional wisdom and taking a stance. These are the people who should be making the intelligence judgments and not the senior officer present.

But, *Government Executive's* sources indicate that the management in certain production areas at CIA has cultivated a breed of generalists who have been elevated from analyst jobs to positions where their hard-gained expertise is soon lost. They adhere to the concept that a man worth his salt can do anything, and thus they have taken to shifting men to different management responsibilities over substantive production, with little regard for the man's preference or substantive skill.

Our sources, some of whom have been in intelligence for a number of years, are angry. They claim that the greatest single asset of the CIA is its people who know and understand a problem area. It is not, they claim, the so-called managers who would prefer to make generalists out of first-rate analysts.

Young Staffers' Solution

Younger staffers with whom *Government Executive* spoke voiced similar complaints but have a different solution. They leave! They revealed that they came to CIA thinking of it as something different... apart from the bureaucratic world. But they confess that it's as bad as anyone could imagine—a gigantic bureaucracy.

Understandably *Government Executive* cannot reveal its sources, but can state that they represent a cross section of young and old from the CIA. They are not simply "cranks." most are dedicated professionals.

The primary purpose of intelligence in their view is to provide the President with sufficient information about a development in foreign affairs which will permit the formulation of a position or policy in time to effectively cope with the situation. In this type of situation, intelligence which warns and assesses the seriousness of an event before it happens is highly prized. Obviously the staffers with whom *Government Executive* talked feel this is not happening these days.

Communication Needed

They report that the White House finally reacted to the kinds of intelligence the agency was issuing. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Assistant for National Security Affairs, now only wants the facts. Apparently he will make all the judgments. The CIA people feel that

this is a bit pretentious of Kissinger. He is not an expert in all areas of the world, they claim.

They hope that Kissinger and his staff will look into the problems within CIA, however. In their view, it would not take a great deal of effort to determine who the real experts are in the community and who the managers are. There should be communication between these experts and the policy-makers in the view of many staffers at CIA, but they are unable to do anything about it themselves.